The U.S.yesterday handed over the reins, so to speak, to the Iraqis to run their government. And then Bremer did what 130,000 American troops would love to do: beat a hasty retreat out of the country. We have to assume he did not let the door hit him in the butt.

The New York Times editorial this morning says it far better than I can:

Two days early, with a veil of secrecy and a tight security lockdown, Washington's proconsul in Iraq, Paul Bremer III, handed a hollow and uncertain sovereignty to Iyad Allawi, a former Baathist collaborator of Saddam Hussein who spent most of the past three decades exiled in London, the last one of those in the pay of America's Central Intelligence Agency. It goes without saying that this is not the sort of outcome the nation envisioned when we sent our forces to liberate Iraq last year.

Moving the transfer date was a sensible precaution against anticipated insurgent attacks. But it underscores how arbitrary the original date, June 30, was all along. Rather than being timed to coincide with a growing capacity of the new Iraqi authorities to take on the challenges of running the country and preparing it for democratic elections, the June date was fixed upon last November to ensure at least the appearance of progress as the American presidential campaign got under way. Dr. Allawi was chosen several weeks ago, in a process endorsed by the United Nations, as Iraq's interim prime minister. But nobody, including Bush administration officials, can seriously believe that Dr. Allawi and his cabinet are now in any position to run Iraq and prepare it for democratic elections.

Ready or not, Dr. Allawi and his colleagues will now speak for Iraq. But whether their words will mean anything will continue to depend largely on outsiders, like the generals commanding the roughly 140,000 United States troops now posted to Iraq indefinitely, and the American aid administrators and contractors, who control billions of dollars' worth of reconstruction work.

With all the emphasis on change, it is important to bear in mind how many important things are not changing. The violent insurgency continues unchecked, as was demonstrated by the stealthy arrangements surrounding yesterday's transfer ceremony. Until a more adequate degree of security is established, civilians, including United Nations officials and employees of private construction companies, will proceed warily, delaying Iraq's political and physical reconstruction.

Today, the primary military responsibility for fighting the insurgency remains as much in American hands as it did yesterday. It is thus ludicrous for administration officials to suggest that America's occupation of Iraq has now somehow ended. It has merely moved to a new stage.

Washington hopes that from now on, some of the most visible security assignments in major cities can begin to be passed to the Iraqi Army and police forces. NATO made a vaguely worded offer yesterday to help with training Iraqi forces. But the record so far is anything but encouraging. When asked to fight Iraqi insurgents, the local security forces have generally melted away.

Few Iraqis took to the streets yesterday to celebrate the new order, in part because they were as surprised as everyone else by the decision to hold the transfer ceremony two days early. But they are also understandably skeptical about whether anything important in their lives will now change. They will especially be looking to see whether the Allawi government can bring electricity to their homes and order to their streets without reverting to the dictatorial tactics reminiscent of 35 years of Baathist rule.

It's a daunting challenge that the occupation government, with all its resources, was unable to achieve. Dr. Allawi will face the same obstacles, like power-line saboteurs and the lack of trained and reliable Iraqi police officers. He already seems tempted to look for shortcuts — like imposing martial law. Another ominous suggestion attributed to him last week, but since repudiated, was to postpone the elections scheduled for next January.

It will be the job of Dr. Allawi's American allies to help him resist such impulses. This interim government's most important political responsibility is to make it possible for Iraq's rival political, religious and ethnic factions to negotiate a livable constitutional settlement, not to use force to impose a new dictatorial order.

Washington also needs to demonstrate that it is not pulling all the strings from behind the scenes. It must move sharply away from the overreaching micromanagement that characterized Mr. Bremer's tenure as the chief American occupation administrator in Iraq. Almost up to the moment of his departure yesterday, Mr. Bremer acted like an imperial proconsul with a mighty army to enforce his often arbitrary decrees instead of an increasingly weary and overtaxed occupation force.

The new United States representative in Iraq, Ambassador John Negroponte, should try to defer to the Allawi government as much as possible. But Washington cannot shed its responsibility for what happens from here on out. The Bush administration has handed off the symbols of sovereignty. But if Iraq dissolves into dictatorship or civil war, the White House will not be able to hand off the blame.